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I. INTRODUCTION
A typical construction project can bring together various
actors, including the job site owner, general contractor, subcon-
tractor, and the employees of each.' In addition to familiar
common law duties, such as the duties owed to invitees, licen-
sees, or trespassers, 2 federal and state agencies have enacted
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1. The Washington Department of Labor and Industries (Labor and Industries)
defines a contractor as follows:
A "contractor" is any person, firm, or corporation who or which, in the
pursuit of an independent business undertakes to, or offers to undertake, or
submits a bid to, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move,
wreck or demolish, for another, any building, highway, road, railroad,
excavation or other structure, project, development, or improvement attached
to real estate or to do any part thereof.
DIVISION OF INDUS. SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEP'T OF LABOR AND INDUS., WISHA REGIONAL
DImCTIVE 3 (Sept. 29, 1993) (Draft No. 12). Labor and Industries defines a general con-
tractor as follows:
A "General Contractor" is a contractor whose business operations require
the use of any unrelated building trades or crafts whose work the contractor
shall superintend or do in whole or in part. The terms "general contractor" and
"builder" are synonymous. The term "general contractor" shall include a prime
contractor, that is, a contractor that has the prime or overall responsibility to
superintend other general or subcontractors.
Id. Labor and Industries defines a subcontractor as "any contractor, including a spe-
cialty contractor, that is subordinate to a general or prime contractor." Id.
2. Washington courts follow the common law rule that the classification of the
person entering the property determines the scope of the property owner's duty. Younce
v. Ferguson, 106 Wash. 2d 658, 666-67, 724 P.2d 991, 993 (1986); Trueax v. Ernst Home
Ctr., 70 Wash. App. 381, 387, 853 P.2d 491, 494 (1993).
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numerous complicated statutes and regulations that require
safe and reasonable working conditions on the job site. The
combination of the various job site actors and the numerous
common law and statutory regulations provide an injured
employee or employee's estate with several potential sources of
compensation for the employee's injuries or death.
The situation in Washington State is no exception to the
above scenario. Although workers' compensation statutes limit
the amount of compensation that an injured employee may
recover from his or her immediate employer,3 Washington
expressly permits an injured employee or employee's estate to
bring an action against a third person.4 Within the construc-
tion context, this third person may be a subcontractor, a general
contractor, or even a job site owner.5
In Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc.,6 the Washington Supreme Court
imposed liability for job site safety on general contractors on the
presumption that general contractors possess "innate supervi-
sory authority" over the job site.7 The court found this innate
supervisory authority to constitute per se control over the job
site and to justify placing the duty to comply with statutory
safety regulations on the general contractor as a matter of law.'
The court did, however, limit the applicability of the presump-
tion of innate supervisory authority. It held that defendants
who fit within the statutory definition of employer but lack
supervisory authority, must have actual control of the danger-
ous condition to be held liable.9
Following Stute, the Washington Court of Appeals, relying
on unique factual circumstances where general contractors and
developers were also the job site owners, extended liability for
3. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04-51.98 (1992).
4. Id. § 51.24.030(1) ("If a third person, not in a worker's same employ, is or may
become liable to pay damages on account of a worker's injury for which benefits and
compensation are provided under this title, the injured worker or beneficiary may elect
to seek damages from the third person.").
5. Although this Comment focuses on the construction context, liability for job site
safety has been extended to job site owners in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Doss v.
ITT Rayonier, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 125, 803 P.2d 4 (holding a job site owner liable for the
death of an independent contractor's employee while cleaning the owner's boiler), review
denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991).
6. 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
7. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 461, 788 P.2d at 549.
[Vol. 17:355
Job Site Safety In Washington
job site safety to job site owners.' 0 Rather than employing a
case-by-case actual control analysis, the court of appeals based
their decisions on the mistaken presumption that job site own-
ers, like general contractors, possess innate supervisory author-
ity that constitutes per se control over the job site."
In contrast to the appellate courts' reliance on the mistaken
presumption that a job site owner has innate supervisory
authority, the Washington Supreme Court in Hennig v. Crosby
Group, Inc. 2 reaffirmed Stute's requirement that actual control
over the job site be found before a court can impose liability for
job site safety on a defendant other than a general contractor.'"
In Hennig, the court looked to the degree of control actually
retained by the job site owner instead of presuming innate
supervisory authority.14 The injured employee in Hennig, how-
ever, relied exclusively on common law theories of liability and
failed to assert a statutory violation. The subject of this Com-
ment is whether the actual control requirement in Hennig
should also be employed to find liability in cases involving
asserted statutory violations.
This Comment argues that Washington courts should
employ the same case-by-case control analysis used to impose
the common law duty to provide a safe workplace to impose
similar statutory duties on a job site owner. Part II of this Com-
ment briefly identifies the possible sources of a job site owner's
duties, including common law, contract, and statute. Part III
explains the current status of job site owner liability in Wash-
ington. This Part carefully distinguishes between the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's consistent use of an actual control
requirement for job site owners, and the Washington Court of
Appeals' misconceived presumption of a job site owners' innate
supervisory authority. Finally, Part IV explains why it is criti-
10. George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 67 Wash.
App. 468, 836 P.2d 851 (1992); see also Doss v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 125,
803 P.2d 4, review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991); Weinert v. Bronco
Nat'l Co., 58 Wash. App. 692, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990); Husfloen v. MTA Constr. Inc., 58
Wash. App. 686, 794 P.2d 859, review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d 325 (1990).
11. Sollitt, 67 Wash. App. at 473 n.4, 836 P.2d at 833 n.4; see also Doss, 60 Wash.
App. at 125, 803 P.2d at 4; Weinert, 58 Wash. App. at 692, 795 P.2d at 1167; Husfloen,
58 Wash. App. at 686, 794 P.2d at 859.
12. 116 Wash. 2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991).
13. Id. at 133-34, 802 P.2d at 791-92.
14. The job site owner did not (1) actively supervise employees, (2) furnish the
materials or equipment that the employees used, (3) have superior knowledge that the
materials were defective, or (4) affirmatively contribute to the risk of injury on the job
site. Id. at 134, 802 P.2d at 792.
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cal that a court find actual control before imposing statutory
duties on job site owners.
II. SOURCES OF JOB SITE OWNERS' DUTIES
In the construction context, the job site owner traditionally
contracts with an independent general contractor or one or
more independent subcontractors. 15 Under common law, an
employer who contracts with an independent contractor is gen-
erally not liable for the injuries to the independent contractor or
its employees. 16 Exceptions to this general rule of employer
nonliability stem from common law, contract, and statute.'"
A. Common Law Exceptions to Employer Nonliability
Under common law, there are several exceptions to
employer nonliability under which an employer can be held lia-
ble for its own negligence. 18 For example, where there is a fore-
seeable risk of harm to others, an employer has a duty to
exercise reasonable care in selecting a competent, experienced,
and careful independent contractor with the proper equip-
15. In addition to the employer-independent contractor relationship that exists
between a job site owner and a general contractor or subcontractor(s), a general
contractor will typically contract with one or more independent subcontractors for
specific tasks on the job site. Furthermore, many of these "first-tier" subcontractors will
contract with one or more "second-tier" independent subcontractors. Finally, each
general contractor and first-tier or second-tier subcontractor may have several
employees.
Many of the cases cited throughout this Comment focus on the general contractor's
liability for injuries sustained by the employees of a first-tier or second-tier
subcontractor. Each exception to the general rule of employer nonliability applies
equally to each of the employer-independent contractor relationships found on a typical
job site: (1) the job site owner who contracts with independent general contractors and
independent subcontractors, (2) the general contractor who contracts with one or more
first-tier subcontractors, and (3) the first-tier subcontractor who contracts with one or
more second-tier subcontractors. See Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash.
2d 323, 325, 582 P.2d 500, 502 (1978) (general contractor and independent
subcontractor); Doss, 60 Wash. App. at 126, 803 P.2d 5 (job site owner and independent
contractor).
16. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 460, 788 P.2d 545, 548 (1990);
Kennedy v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 62 Wash. App. 839, 850, 816 P.2d 75, 80 (1991);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 511 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
17. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 330, 582 P.2d at 505; Kennedy, 62 Wash. App. at 855,
816 P.2d at 83; PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71, at 511.
18. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274, 281, 635 P.2d
426, 430 (1981) (recognizing an exception to the rule of nonliability when an owner is
personally negligent).
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ment. 19 Similarly, where an employer gives directions for the
work,2 ° or furnishes equipment for the work,2 1 the employer
must exercise reasonable care to protect others. Finally, where
the employer retains control over a part of the work of the
independent contractor, the employer has a duty to provide a
safe workplace within the scope of the employer's control.22
In Washington, the proper control inquiry is not whether
the employer actually interfered with the independent contrac-
tor's work, but whether the employer retained control over or
had the right to control the manner and means of doing the
work.23 However, retaining the right merely to inspect and
supervise to ensure the proper completion of a contract does not
constitute a sufficient degree of control to impose a duty to pro-
vide a safe workplace.24
The policies behind these common law exceptions focus on
the employer's primary role in the enterprise. The independent
contractor's work personally benefits the employer. 25 Also, the
employer may contract with an independent contractor who is
financially responsible and able to indemnify the employer.26
Furthermore, the employer is in the best position to bear the
cost of the insurance necessary to allocate risk.
B. Contractual Exceptions to Employer Nonliability
Contractual provisions provide a second exception to the
general rule of employer nonliability. 28 A contract may impose
affirmative duties on the employer to provide a safe work-
19. Id. at 218, 635 P.2d at 433; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965);
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71, at 510.
20. Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296, 312, 16 P.2d 601, 607 (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 (1965); PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71, at 510.
21. Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wash. 2d 647, 651, 364
P.2d 796, 799 (1961) (citing Jenkins v. Banks, 87 A.2d 908 (Me. 1952)); PROSSER, supra
note 16, § 71, at 510.
22. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 332, 582 P.2d 500,
505 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965); PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71,
at 510.
23. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 331, 582 P.2d at 505; Fardig v. Reynolds, 55 Wash. 2d
540, 544, 348 P.2d 661, 663 (1960).
24. Hennig v. Crosby Group, Inc., 116 Wash. 2d 131, 134, 802 P.2d 790, 792 (1991);
Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 785, 399 P.2d 591, 596 (1965).
25. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71, at 509.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 333, 582 P.2d 500,
506 (1978); PROSSER, supra note 16, § 71, at 511.
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place. 29 For example, the employer's liability in Kelley v. How-
ard S. Wright Construction Co.,"° was predicated in part on the
employer's contract, wherein the employer (1) assumed respon-
sibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety
precautions and programs in connection with the work on the
job site; (2) agreed to comply with all applicable safety regula-
tions; and (3) agreed to maintain reasonable safeguards. 3
C. Statutory Exceptions to Employer Nonliability
Statutorily imposed duties provide the final exception to
the general rule of employer nonliability. In Washington,
employers owe a duty to comply or to ensure compliance with
applicable safety regulations to all employees on the job site,
including an independent contractor's employees. 32  However,
Washington courts have limited this exception of nonliability to
employers who retain control over some portion of the job site.33
When the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSH Act)34 was enacted, responsibility for the enforcement of
occupational safety and health standards in private workplaces
was generally removed from state jurisdiction5.3  Acting in
29. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 334, 582 P.2d at 507; see also Smith v. United States,
497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the employer (general contractor)
contractually assumed affirmative duties for safety that rendered him liable to an
independent contractor's (subcontractor's) employee); Presser v. Siesel Constr. Co., 119
N.W.2d 405 (Wis. 1963) (holding that the employer (general contractor) contractually
assumed affirmative duties that required compliance with a safety manual). But see
West v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 451 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a tort action
against the employer (general contractor) could not be based on contractual obligations).
30. 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
31. Id. at 330, 582 P.2d at 506.
32. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 460, 788 P.2d 545, 548 (1990).
33. See, e.g., id. at 463, 788 P.2d at 550 (holding that a general contractor's
supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the workplace to impose a
statutory duty to ensure compliance with safety regulations and that parties who fit the
statutory definition of employer but lack supervisory authority, must have control to be
held liable). Some commentators argue that Washington's statutes alone are an
exception to employer nonliability regardless of the amount of control the employer
actually retains. Stephen L. Bulzomi & John L. Messina, Jr., Washington's Industrial
Safety Regulations: The Trend Towards Greater Protection for Workers, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 315 (1994). This conclusion, however, completely ignores the purpose of
part two of the Stute decision. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, from these commentators' perspective, given WISHA's broad definition of
"employer," every property owner in Washington, including private homeowners, could
be required to comply with statutory safety regulations. See infra note 82.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
35. Id. § 668(a); John R. Dick, Washington Job Safety Legislation, 9 GONZ. L. REV.
457 (1974).
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response to a 1970 House Report,3 6 Congress passed the OSH
Act "to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possi-
ble every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources."37
Under the OSH Act, Congress placed the responsibility for
employee safety directly on the employer.3 8  Nearly every
employer, with the exception of the federal government, must
comply with safety and health standards promulgated under
the Act.3 9 Where no standards apply, an employer must pro-
vide its employees with a place of employment free from recog-
nized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious injury.4 °
An employer who fails to comply with the Act is subject to
enforcement proceedings initiated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA).4 1 Once an OSHA inspector
has determined that a violation exists, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services may issue a citation and proposed pen-
alty.4 2 The employer may accept the proposed penalty as a fine,
36. The House Report found as follows:
The on-the-job health and safety crises is the worst problem confronting
American workers, because each year as a result of their jobs over 14,500
workers die. In only four years' time, as many people have died because of
their employment as have been killed in almost a decade of American
involvement in Vietnam. Over two million workers are disabled annually
through job related accidents.
The economic impact of occupational accidents and diseases is
overwhelming. Over $1.5 billion is wasted on lost wages, and the annual loss
to the Gross National Product is over $8 billion. Ten times as many days are
lost from job-related disabilities as from strikes, and days lost productivity
through accidents and illnesses are ten times greater than the loss from
strikes.
The Committee recognizes the enormity of the problems of occupational
safety and health, and its hearings disclosed that the problems seem to be
getting worse, not better.
H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
38. Id. § 654(a). Section 654(a) provides that "[elach employer (1) shall furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
his employees; (2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this chapter." Id.
39. Id. § 652(5).
40. Id. § 654(a)(1); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1975).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1988). OSHA is responsible for almost all safety and health
matters under the OSH Act, including enforcement. Richard S. Thwaites, Jr., The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 9 GONz. L. REv. 477, 479
(1974).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1988).
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or contest the citation.43 If the employer chooses to accept the
proposed fine, it must abate the hazard within the abatement
period specified in the citation.44
Despite the OSH Act's intention to preempt state jurisdic-
tion over occupational safety and health issues, the Act
expressly allows states to submit plans to develop and enforce
state health and safety standards.4 5 Washington submitted
such a plan, and on June 7, 1973, the State enacted the Wash-
ington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA)4" to
replace the OSH Act in administering occupational safety and
health in the State of Washington.47
WISHA was enacted to "create, maintain, continue, and
enhance" an industrial safety and health program of the state
equal to, or exceeding, the standards promulgated under the
OSH Act.4' Application of WISHA is conditioned on the exist-
ence of an employer-employee relationship in any private or
public job site within the state.49 The only job sites excluded
are those under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment.5" The Washington Department of Labor and Industries,
acting through the Director of Labor and Industries, is the sole
agency responsible for the administration of WISHA's
provisions. 51
Like its federal counterpart, WISHA contains both general
safety and health standards that apply to a wide range of indus-
tries,52 and specific standards promulgated for specific indus-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 667.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (1992).
47. Dick, supra note 35; Christine Ellison, Comment, Washington's Hazard
Communication Standard, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 509, 511 (1985). WISHA also replaced
Washington's earlier occupational safety and health statute codified at Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) 49.16. Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act, ch. 80, § 28,
1973 Wash. Laws 212, 234.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1992).
49. Id. § 49.17.030.
50. Id. § 49.17.020(3), (7).
51. Id. §§ 49.17.020(2), .270.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060(1) (1992) provides as follows:
Each employer:
Shall furnish to each of his employees a place of employment free from
recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause serious injury or death to
his employees: PROVIDED, That no citation or order assessing a penalty shall
be issued to any employer solely under the authority of this subsection except
where no applicable rule or regulation has been adopted by the department
[Vol. 17:355
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tries.53 The specific safety and health standards are adopted
pursuant to the provisions of the Washington Administrative
Procedure Act 54 and WISHA.
55
WISHA often impacts negligence actions brought by an
injured employee against defendants other than his or her
immediate employer. The violation of a WISHA health or safety
standard may be considered by a court as evidence of an
employer's negligence.56 Although WISHA is expressly limited
to an employer-employee relationship, the courts have had diffi-
culty defining the scope of WISHA's protections.
In attempting to further WISHA's purposes, the courts
have interpreted WISHA's general and specific safety and
health standards differently. 58 The general health and safety
standard,59 which requires an employer to protect "his employ-
covering the unsafe or unhealthful condition of employment at the
workplace....
53. Id. § 49.17.060(2). Each employer "[sihall comply with the rules and
regulations, and orders promulgated under this chapter." Id.
54. Id. § 34.05.
55. Id. § 49.17.040.
56. Id. § 5.40.050 ("A breach of a duty imposed by statute, ordinance, or
administrative rule shall not be considered negligence per se, but may be considered by
the trier of fact as evidence of negligence. . . ."); see also Doss v. I7T Rayonier, Inc., 60
Wash. App. 125, 129-30, 803 P.2d 4, 7 ("The practical effect of RCW 5.40.050 is to
eliminate what might be called the 'strict liability' character of statutory violations
under the old negligence per se doctrine, but to allow a jury to weigh the violation, along
with other relevant factors, in reaching its ultimate determination of liability."), review
denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991).
57. Compare Ward v. Ceco Corp., 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (holding that
Washington Admininistrative Code (WAC) 296-155-040, promulgated under WISHA,
imposes a duty on an employer to all employees, including the independent contractor's
employees), review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 859, 711 P.2d 310 (1985) with Straw v. Esteem
Constr. Co., 45 Wash. App. 869, 728 P.2d 1052 (1986) (holding that the identical WAC
section imposes a duty on an employer, but only to its own employees), rev'd, 114 Wash.
2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
Furthermore, under WISHA's broad language, several actors on a job site may fall
within the statutory definition of "employer.' Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454,
463, 788 P.2d 545, 550 (1990). WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.020(3) (1992) defines an
employer as follows:
any person, firm, corporation, partnership, business trust, legal representative,
or other business entity which engages in any business, industry, profession, or
activity in this state and employs one or more employees or who contracts with
one or more persons, the essence of which is the personal labor of such person
or persons and includes the state, counties, cities, and all municipal
corporations, public corporations, political subdivisions of the state, and
charitable organizations: PROVIDED, That any person, partnership, or
business entity not having employees, and who is covered by the industrial
insurance act shall be considered both an employer and an employee.
58. Goucher v. J. R. Simplot Co., 104 Wash. 2d 662, 671, 709 P.2d 774, 780 (1985).
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060(1) (1992).
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ees" from recognized hazards not covered by specific regula-
tions, protects only an employer's immediate employees.6 ° In
contrast, WISHA's specific safety and health regulations 61 pro-
tect all employees working on a job site who may be harmed by
an employer's violation of the WISHA regulations.62 Thus, an
employer's liability depends on which safety standard is
invoked. Where an independent contractor's injured employee
asserts that an employer failed to comply with specific WISHA
regulations, the employer may be held liable.63
Whether the employer is actually held liable, however,
turns on whether the employer has retained control over the
independent contractor's work.64 Thus, to find a statutory
exception to the general rule of employer nonliability, it is criti-
cal to assess the amount of the employer's control.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF JOB SITE OWNER LIABILITY
A. The Washington Supreme Court 1978-1990
Common law, contractual, and statutory exceptions to
employer nonliability were used by the Washington Supreme
Court in Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co.65 In Kel-
ley, a subcontractor's employee brought a negligence action
against the general contractor for injuries sustained from fall-
ing twenty-nine feet onto a concrete floor.66 The employee
alleged that the general contractor was negligent in failing to
provide a safety net, which, he claimed, was required by an
OSHA safety regulation.67 The general contractor's contract
with the job site owner provided that the general contractor
would assume sole responsibility for supervising and coordinat-
60. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 457, 788 P.2d at 547; Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 110 Wash. 2d 128, 152, 750 P.2d 1257, 1271 (1988).
61. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.17.060(2) (1992).
62. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 457, 788 P.2d at 547; Adkins, 110 Wash. 2d at 152, 750
P.2d at 1271; Goucher, 104 Wash. 2d at 672, 709 P.2d at 774.
63. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 457, 788 P.2d at 547.
64. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550. The WISHA control requirement stems from the
common law retained control exception of employer nonliabilty to independent
contractors and their employees. Id. at 460, 788 P.2d at 548; see supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
65. 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
66. Id. at 327, 582 P.2d at 503.
67. "Safety nets shall be provided when workplaces are more than 25 feet above the
ground or water surface, or other surfaces where the use of ladders, scaffolds, catch
platforms, temporary floors, safety lines, or safety belts is impractical." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.105(a) (1992).
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ing all aspects of the work." Furthermore, the general contrac-
tor "agreed to be responsible for 'initiating, maintaining and
supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection
with the work' and to 'erect and maintain as required by
existing conditions and progress of the work, all reasonable
safeguards for safety and protection.'"
69
Although the court acknowledged the general rule of
employer nonliability for the injuries to employees of independ-
ent contractors, the court concluded that the general contractor
owed a duty to the subcontractor's employees to "provide a rea-
sonably safe workplace and reasonable safety equipment."7 °
The general contractor's failure to comply with its common law,
contractual, and statutory duty to provide a reasonably safe
place of work and reasonable safety equipment established a
basis for liability to the injured employee.7 '
According to the Kelley court, the general contractor's gen-
eral supervisory functions under its contract with the job site
owner constituted sufficient control over the injured employee's
workplace to justify finding an exception to the general rule of
nonliability.7 2 The general contractor's right to require the use
of safety precautions or to halt dangerous work in adverse
weather conditions was sufficient to establish the general con-
tractor's control.73
In part two of its opinion, the Kelley court held that the
general contractor's authority over the employee's workplace
and voluntary contractual assumption of the duty to comply
with safety regulations required that the general contractor
comply with OSHA safety regulations.7 4 The general contrac-
68. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 327, 582 P.2d at 503.
69. Id. The employee's direct employer (subcontractor) contractually agreed with
the general contractor to assume responsibility for any statutory violations. Id.
Unfortunately, the case provides no information as to the role or conduct of the job site
owner.
70. Id. at 334, 582 P.2d at 507.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 331, 582 P.2d at 505.
73. Id. The general contractor's contract with the construction site owner provided
two alternative bases for finding an exception. First, the contract evidenced the general
contractor's retained supervisory and coordinating authority, which provided a basis for
the common law retained control exception. Id. at 330-331, 582 P.2d at 506. Second,
the contract itself provided a means from which the injured employee could claim an
exception to the general rule as a third party beneficiary. Id. 333-34, 582 P.2d at 506-
507.
74. Id. at 331, 334, 582 P.2d at 505, 508. Whether the OSH Act mandate of
employer compliance with OSHA regulations applies to general contractors when the
persons affected are the subcontractor's employees is uncertain. See Brennan v. Gilles
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tor's violation of the OSHA regulation constituted negligence
per se.75
Twelve years after Kelley, the Washington Supreme Court
made it much easier for injured employees of independent con-
tractors to establish the requisite degree of control to find a
statutory exception to employer nonliability. In Stute v.
P.B.M.C., Inc.,76 a subcontractor's employee sustained injuries
after he slipped and fell three stories while installing gutters on
a rain-soaked roof 7 7 The employee brought suit against the
general contractor alleging that the general contractor owed
him a duty to provide safety devices required under WISHA.78
The Washington Supreme Court agreed and held that
employers must comply with WISHA regulations to protect all
employees on a job site, even the employees of an independent
contractor.7 9 The Stute court, however, was not finished.
In part two of its opinion, the court held that where both
the subcontractor and general contractor fit the statutory defi-
nition of employer, "the primary employer, the general contrac-
tor, has, as a matter of policy, the duty to comply with or ensure
compliance with WISHA and its regulations."80 The court
found a general contractor's innate supervisory authority to
constitute per se control over the workplace, and therefore
placed the duty to comply with WISHA regulations on the gen-
eral contractor as a matter of law.81 The court further held that
parties other than a general contractor who fit the statutory
& Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that a general contractor does
not bear joint responsibility with a subcontractor for compliance with OSHA
regulations). But see Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1975) (holding that
the employer who has control over the work area in which a hazard exists is responsible
for complying with OSHA regulations); Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1975) (applying a similar control test).
75. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 336, 582 P.2d at 508. The court's decision was made
prior to Washington's enactment of RCW 5.40.050, which eliminated strict liability for
statutory violations. See supra note 56.
76. 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
77. Id. at 456, 788 P.2d at 546.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 457, 788 P.2d at 547.
80. Id. at 463, 788 P.2d at 550 ("A general contractor's supervisory authority places
the general [contractor] in the best position to ensure compliance with safety
regulations. For this reason, the prime responsibility for safety of all workers should
rest on the general contractor."); see also Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596
(8th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that "[gleneral contractors normally have the responsibility
and means to assure that other contractors fulfill their obligations with respect to
employee safety where those obligations affect the construction worksite").
81. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 464, 788 P.2d at 550-51.
[Vol. 17:355
Job Site Safety In Washington
definition of employer but lack supervisory authority, must
have control of, or create, the dangerous condition to be held
liable.82
Based on the supreme court's decisions in Kelley and Stute,
a court must find that the employer of an independent contrac-
tor retained control over some portion of the independent con-
tractor's work before the court can find a statutory exception to
the general rule of employer nonliability. Although WISHA's
regulations provide protection to the employees of independent
contractors, a court still must find that the employer retained
control over the independent contractor before the employer has
a duty to comply or ensure compliance with WISHA regula-
tions. What is necessary to prove control, however, may differ
depending on the identity of the employer. With respect to gen-
eral contractors, the general contractor's innate supervisory
authority constitutes per se control and, therefore, justifies
finding an exception to the general rule of employer nonliabil-
ity. The general contractor need not have actual control. In
contrast, parties other than general contractors who lack super-
visory authority must have control of the dangerous condition to
be held liable.
B. Washington Court of Appeals' Decisions Following Stute
Within months after the supreme court's decision in Stute,
the court of appeals began applying the Stute presumption of
innate supervisory authority to defendants other than general
contractors. In Husoen v. MTA Construction, Inc., 3 the Divi-
sion One Court of Appeals imposed the duty of ensuring compli-
ance with WISHA regulations on both a general contractor/job
site owner and a subcontractor.8 4 The general contractor/job
82. Id. at 461, 788 P.2d at 549. This interpretation is further supported by the
Washington Court of Appeals' decision of Kennedy v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 62 Wash.
App. 839, 854, 816 P.2d 75, 83 (1991). In Kennedy, the court limited WISHA's
application to employers other than general contractors "who exercise the requisite
degree of control over the work of the independent contractor." Id. The court recognized
that under WISHA's broad definition of employer, an inexperienced widow employing a
contractor could be held responsible for complying with WISHA's detailed regulations:
An inexperienced widow employing a contractor to build a house is not to be
expected to have the same information, or to make the same inquiries, as to
whether the work to be done is likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm
to others, or to require special precautions, as a real estate development
company employing a contractor to build the same house.
Id. (quoting Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 595 P.2d 619, 622 (Cal. 1979)).
83. 58 Wash. App. 686, 794 P.2d 859 (1990).
84. Id. at 692, 794 P.2d at 862.
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site owner contracted with a subcontractor who hired an
independent subcontracting firm to pump concrete.85 Husfloen,
an employee of the independent pumping firm, was electrocuted
after extending a concrete pumping boom into a 7200 volt
power line. 8 The employee's estate sued the subcontractor and
the general contractor/job site owner alleging that both were
negligent in allowing or instructing the employee to operate the
boom within ten feet of the power line.
7
The Husfloen court held that under Stute, the general con-
tractor/job site owner had a duty to comply or ensure compli-
ance with WISHA regulations because the general contractor/
job site owner occupied the same role as the pure general con-
tractor occupied in Stute. 8 Furthermore, the court held that
the subcontractor owed a duty to the employee because the sub-
contractor was in a better position to ensure compliance with
WISHA regulations than the general contractor/job site
owner.89
On the same day Husfloen was decided, the Division One
Court of Appeals employed the presumption of innate supervi-
sory authority to impose liability on a developer/job site owner
in Weinert v. Bronco National Co.90 In Weinert, the injured
employee fell off defective scaffolding, which had been brought
on the job site and erected by the employee's immediate
employer, an independent siding company hired by a subcon-
tractor.9' The employee sued the developer/job site owner and
the subcontractor, asserting that both had committed several
WISHA violations.92
85. Id. at 687, 794 P.2d at 860.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 688, 794 P.2d at 860. The WISHA regulation, applicable at the time of
the accident, prohibited work to be performed or equipment operated within 10 feet of
an overhead wire. Id.
88. Id. at 689, 794 P.2d at 861.
89. Id. at 690, 794 P.2d at 861. The subcontractor alone selected the pumping firm,
contacted the firm, and supervised the actual pouring of the concrete. The general
contractor/job site owner did not have a representative at the job site on the day the
accident occurred. Id.
90. 58 Wash. App. 692, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990).
91. At the trial level, there was no direct evidence that the developer/job site owner
or the subcontractor erected the scaffolding or knew of the alleged defects in the
scaffolding. Id. at 693, 795 P.2d at 1168.
92. Id. at 694-95, 795 P.2d at 1169. The specific regulations allegedly violated,
WAC 296-155-485, relating to scaffolding, and WAC 296-155-480, relating to ladders,
require nearly 18 pages of technical text.
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Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the employee's com-
plaint, the appellate court concluded that the presumption of
innate supervisory authority enunciated in Stute applied
equally to a developer/job site owner.93 Like the pure general
contractor in Stute, the developer/job site owner in Weinert pos-
sessed the same innate supervisory authority and was, there-
fore, in the best position to enforce compliance with WISHA
regulations.94
Furthermore, the court held that under Stute, the subcon-
tractor also owed the employee a duty to enforce applicable
safety regulations. 95 The court found that the subcontractor
maintained the same innate supervisory authority over the
independent siding company's work as the developer/job site
owner maintained over the entire job site. 96 However, unlike
the developer/job site owner who had broad supervisory respon-
sibilities, the subcontractor had only limited supervisory
authority that required that the subcontractor's duties be lim-
ited to the scope of its contract with the developer/job site
owner.
97
Six months after the Weinert decision, the Division Two
Court of Appeals applied the presumption of innate supervisory
authority to a pure job site owner outside of the construction
context. In Doss v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,9 an independent con-
tractor's employee was killed while cleaning a boiler at the
owner's mill.99 The employee's representative brought a wrong-
ful death action against the owner alleging that the owner owed
the employee a duty to comply with WISHA regulations. 100
Relying on Stute and Weinert, the court concluded that
there was no significant difference between the present job site
owner-independent contractor relationship and the general con-
93. Weinert, 58 Wash. App. at 696, 795 P.2d at 1170.
94. Id. The court failed to give any factual support to its claim that the developer/
job site owner had the same supervisory authority as the general contractor in Stute.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 697, 795 P.2d at 1170 ("As a practical matter, [the subcontractor] was
probably in a better position to inspect and supervise the activities of [the independent
siding company's] employees in installing siding than was [the developer/job site
owner], whose supervisory responsibilities were much broader.").
97. Id.
98. 60 Wash. App. 125, 803 P.2d 4, review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1034,813 P.2d 583
(1991).
99. Id. at 126, 803 P.2d at 5.
100. Id. The WAC requires safety nets "underneath a work area not otherwise
protected from falling objects." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 295-155-230(1)(c) (1992).
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tractor-subcontractor relationships in previous decisions. 10 '
Like the general contractor and subcontractor in Stute, both the
owner and independent contractor in Doss met the statutory
definition of employer.' 0 2 The Doss court held that the owner's
innate supervisory authority that gave him control over the
workplace justified the court's finding that the owner owed a
duty to the employee to comply with WISHA regulations.1
0 3
After reviewing Husfloen, Weinert, and Doss, it appears
that any employer in a supervisory position analogous to a gen-
eral contractor, including a job site owner, is presumed to have
innate supervisory authority over the job site. Relying on an
employer's innate supervisory authority as per se control, a
court can impose on all employers, including job site owners, a
duty owed to all job site employees to comply or ensure compli-
ance with WISHA regulations.1
0 4
The problem with the above analysis is that the innate
supervisory authority presumption becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to justify outside the limited general contractor context. In
reality, the further removed an employer is from the job site
and its corresponding responsibilities, the less likely it is that
the employer will have the expertise necessary to comply or
ensure compliance with detailed WISHA regulations. For
example, it is unreasonable to expect a job site owner to comply
with or even understand WISHA's detailed and technical scaf-
folding regulations. 105 Even the court of appeals has recognized
that, contrary to statements made in Stute,10 6 subcontractors
may be in a better position to comply or ensure compliance with
101. Doss, 60 Wash. App. at 128, 803 P.2d at 6.
102. Id.
103. Id. The only reference to the job site owner and its role was that the job site
owner's supervisor kept a close watch on the independent contractor's work. Id. at 127,
803 P.2d at 5.
104. "An owner has the same duty as a general contractor to all employees on the
jobsite because of its innate supervisory authority." George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard
Chapman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 67 Wash. App. 468, 473 n.4, 836 P.2d 851, 853 n.4
(1992) (citing Doss, 60 Wash. App. at 128, 803 P.2d at 4). "There is no significant
difference between an owner-independent contractor relationship and a general
contractor-subcontractor relationship." Id. (citing Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr.
Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978); Weinert v. Bronco Nat'l Co., 58 Wash. App.
692, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990)).
105. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 296-155-481 to -485 (1992).
106. See supra note 80.
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WISHA regulations than a general contractor/job site owner107or a developer/job site owner.' 0l
C. The Supreme Court After Doss
In Hennig v. Crosby Group,10 9 decided three days after
Doss, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the necessity
of finding actual control before imposing liability on defendants
other than general contractors. l 0 In Hennig, an employee of an
independent contractor was permanently injured while working
on the job site owner's pier."' The employee brought an action
against his immediate employer and the pier owner, but he
failed to assert a WISHA violation. 112
Citing the general rule that the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for the injuries to the independent con-
tractor's employees, the Hennig court conducted an inquiry into
the amount of control the job site owner actually retained over
the independent contractor's work. 1 3 The court concluded that
the job site owner's right to oversee compliance with contract
provisions did not constitute sufficient control over the
independent contractor's work to place the job site owner within
the exception to employer nonliability."
Although Hennig did not involve a WISHA violation, the
supreme court's decision reaffirms the need to find actual con-
trol to impose liability on defendants other than general con-
tractors. The supreme court's refusal in Hennig to rely on the
presumption of innate supervisory authority to find an excep-
tion to the general rule of nonliability contradicts the previous
appellate court decisions in Husfloen, Weinert, and Doss. The
supreme court's refusal can be interpreted two ways. Perhaps a
court may only rely on the presumption of innate supervisory
107. Husfloen v. MTA Constr. Inc., 58 Wash. App. 686, 690, 794 P.2d 859, 861,
review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1031, 803 P.2d 325 (1990).
108. Weinert, 58 Wash. App. at 697, 795 P.2d at 1170.
109. 116 Wash. 2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991).
110. Id. at 134, 802 P.2d at 791-92.
111. Id. at 132-33, 802 P.2d at 791.
112. Id. at 133, 802 P.2d at 791.
113. Id. at 134, 802 P.2d at 792.
114. Id. The contract between the job site owner and independent contractor
assigned to the independent contractor the sole responsibility for supervising job site
safety and required the independent contractor to comply with applicable state and
federal safety regulations. Id. The court found further support for its decision because
the owner (1) did not supervise the independent contractor's employees, (2) had no
superior knowledge that the injured employees' equipment may be defective, and (3) did
nothing to affirmatively increase the risk. Id.
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authority when a plaintiff has alleged violations of specific
WISHA regulations.115 Alternatively, a job site owner's role is
not sufficiently analogous to that of a general contractor to
automatically impose liability under the same rule of law.
The first interpretation is problematic. The presumption of
innate supervisory authority was originally adopted under cir-
cumstances where the defendant, in fact, had control over the
job site. 1 6 Under these limited circumstances, the presumption
is justified by the defendant's supervisory role on the job site,
not the legal nature of the duty involved. WISHA regulations
provide the standard of care owed once control is established."'
Within the general contractor context, Stute held that "[a] gen-
eral contractor's [innate] supervisory authority is per se control
over the workplace.""' Stute merely established the exception
to employer nonliability; the scope of the general contractor's
duty could have been premised on common law or WISHA."19
Because application of the Stute presumption is based on
the defendant's role and not on whether common law or statu-
tory violations are alleged, the Hennig court must have con-
cluded that the role of a job site owner is not sufficiently
analogous to the role of a general contractor to justify extending
liability under the same rule of law. Under this latter interpre-
tation, the court of appeals' reliance on a job site owner's innate
supervisory authority is misplaced. Rather, Hennig correctly
requires that a court conduct a case-by-case inquiry into the
amount of control actually retained by a job site owner before
imposing liability. 2 0
115. If in fact the presumption of innate supervisory authority is only appropriate
under WISHA, it follows that the retained control exception found in Hennig applies
only to common law duties. This conclusion would appear to contradict part two of the
Stute decision. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
116. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 456, 788 P.2d 545, 546 (1990).
117. See id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550 ("[A] general contractor should bear the
primary responsibility for compliance with safety regulations because the general
contractor's innate supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the
workplace.") (emphasis added).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Kennedy v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 62 Wash. App. 839, 854-55, 816 P.2d 75,
83 (1991) (citing Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982)).
120. See also id. at 855, 816 P.2d at 83 (holding eight months after Hennig that a
job site lessee would have the same duty of care as a general contractor under Kelley
only if it retained the requisite amount of control over the work).
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IV. THE NECESSITY OF AcTUAL CONTROL
Hennig's requirement that an owner retain control over
some portion of the job site before a court may recognize a stat-
utory exception to employer nonliability is sound for several
reasons. First, the presumption that an employer has innate
supervisory authority should only apply where the presumption
is justified. Although a job site owner's role is sometimes simi-
lar to the role of a general contractor, blind reliance on the anal-
ogy is wrong. Second, it is nearly impossible for a job site owner
to insure against liability through indemnification. Finally,
both federal and state applications of similar health and safety
statutes require an employer other than an employee's immedi-
ate employer to retain control before the employer has a duty to
comply or ensure compliance with safety regulations.
A. The Job Site Owner
Extending potential liability to a job site owner places the
owner in an awkward and difficult position. To avoid liability,
the owner must aggressively implement and monitor safety pro-
grams. To effectively monitor job site safety, the job site owner
must involve itself with the construction activities on a daily
basis. However, an owner's primary purpose in contracting
with a general contractor to manage a job site is to avoid this
type of daily involvement.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that a job site owner has the
necessary manpower, expertise, or knowledge to comply or
ensure compliance with technical safety regulations.12 1 This is
especially true, for example, in the case of a private homeowner
who hires an independent contractor to reroof his or her home.
Arguably, any private homeowner could fall within WISHA's
broad definition of employer. Under the appellate courts' analy-
sis, the private homeowner would then be required to ensure
that the roofer complied with any applicable WISHA
regulations.
Finally, the confusion associated with the job site owner's
activities on the job site may provide a basis for the general con-
tractor to bring an action against the owner for breach of con-
tract,122 or the owner's personal negligence.123
121. See supra note 82.
122. Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash. 2d 7, 13, 514 P.2d 1381,
1385 (1973) ("In every construction contract there is an implied term that the owner...
will not hinder or delay the contract .. ").
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B. Indemnification
Any effort by a job site owner to avoid liability through
indemnification is also filled with pitfalls. Over recent years,
Washington's laws regarding indemnification contracts have
changed drastically. These changes make indemnification con-
tracts almost impossible.
Under common law, a general contractor could require a
subcontractor to insure against claims made by the subcontrac-
tor's employees. Subcontractors could be required to defend and
indemnify general contractors for claims brought by subcontrac-
tor's employees, even if the employees' injuries were caused by
the general contractor's negligence. 124  General contractors'
indemnification rights, however, began to disappear in Jones v.
Strom Construction Co.' 25 In Jones, the Washington Supreme
Court held that a general contractor could not be indemnified
by a subcontractor for injuries caused by the general contrac-
tor's negligence.'1 2  The rule was later codified at RCW
4.24.115.127
Indemnification rights were limited further in Brown v.
Prime Construction Co.128 The Brown court held that a subcon-
tractor's agreement to indemnify the general contractor for
injury claims from the subcontractor's own employees dis-
favorably circumvents the subcontractor's industrial insurance
immunity. 129 Additionally, the court stated that for an indem-
nification agreement to be enforceable, the agreement must
123. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386
(1970) (holding that neither statute prohibiting employers or workmen from exempting
themselves from the Workmens' Compensation Act precluded enforcement of the
subcontractor's agreement that obligated it to indemnify the general contractor).
125. 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115 (1974).
126. Id. at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118-19.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115(1) (1992) provides as follows:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in, or in connection with or
collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration,
repair, addition to, subtraction from, improvement to, or maintenance of, any
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation, or other structure, project,
development, or improvement attached to real estate, including moving and
demolition in connection therewith, purporting to indemnify against liability
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property: (1)
Caused by or resulting from the sole negligence ofthe indemnitee, his agents or
employees is against public policy and is void and unenforceable....
128. 102 Wash. 2d 235, 684 P.2d 73 (1984).
129. Id. at 239-40, 684 P.2d at 75. The Industrial Insurance Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51 (1992), reflects a strong public policy towards limiting employers' liability for their
employee's job related injuries. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 238, 684 P.2d at 75.
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clearly state (1) that the subcontractor expressly waives its
workers' compensation immunity, or (2) that the subcontractor
expressly assumes potential liability for its own employees'
actions. 130 This rule was also codified.
13 1
Despite the Brown ruling and the enactment of statutory
law, many form indemnification agreements have failed to
change in response to the decision.' 3 2 Moreover, even inserting
a provision meeting the Brown requirements does not yet guar-
antee indemnification. It appears that RCW 4.24.115(1) limits
the effectiveness of an indemnification agreement that appor-
tions liability between a job site owner and a general contractor,
even if based on the owner's passive negligence. 133 Finally, it
is unclear whether the duty to provide a safe job site is
nondelegable.'3 4
C. Federal and State Control Requirements
Other jurisdictions have experienced similar difficulty in
deciding whether to extend liability for job site safety beyond an
employee's immediate employer. Unfortunately, the federal
approach to job site safety under the OSH Act provides no real
guidance. Both federal and state applications of OSHA require-
ments 135 have resulted in divergent decisions on whether the
employer's duty to comply or ensure compliance with OSHA
In general, RCW 51.04.010 grants tort immunity to employers and, in
exchange, gives employees sure and certain relief for any job related injury.
Indemnity provisions operate to circumvent the Act's provisions by allowing
employers to be ultimately liable for tort damages resulting from an employee's
job related injury. Thus, indemnity provisions, in effect, waive the Industrial
Insurance Act's immunity.
Id.
130. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 239-40, 684 P.2d at 75.
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115(2) (1992).
132. JOHN A. MANIX, CONSTRUCTION SITE INJURIES TO SUBCONTRACTORS
EMPLOYEES: THE DRAMATIC EXPANSION OF LIABILITY FOR GENERAL CONTRACTORS 2-49
(1992) (on file with University of Puget Sound Law Review).
133. See generally id.; John W. Rankin, Jr., Indemnity, Apportionment and
Insurance and the Construction Site Injury Claim, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND
PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION LAW (April 1992). Passive negligence in this context refers to
liability imposed on a job site owner for failing to provide a safe workplace when there is
no finding of negligent conduct by the owner.
134. See Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 333, 582 P.2d
500, 506 (1978) (holding that the general contractor had a nondelegable duty of care to
employees of the subcontractor under the general contractor's contract with the owner).
But see Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545, 551 (1990) (holding
that a general contractor has the responsibility "to furnish safety equipment or to
contractually require subcontractors to furnish safety equipment") (emphasis added).
135. See supra note 38.
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safety regulations extends beyond the employer's immediate
employees.' 3 6 Despite these contrasting decisions, every court
has held that the employer must retain or exercise a requisite
amount of actual control over some portion of the job site for
liability to be imposed. 137  Applying OSHA standards, the
courts have never relied on an employer's innate supervisory
authority to justify extending the duty.13 8 Moreover, the OSH
Act's general and specific duty clauses have not been inter-
preted as expanding job site owner responsibilities.
3 9
Like Washington, several other states have enacted occupa-
tional safety and health statutes similar to the OSH Act that
require employers to provide employees with a safe workplace
and to comply with specific safety regulations. 140  State court
136. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the general duty clause (29 U.S.C. § 654(aX1)) imposes a duty of
reasonable care on every employer to protect its direct employees from recognized
hazards regardless of the employer's amount of control, and that the specific duty clause
(29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(2)) protects all employees on the job site, including an independent
contractor's employees, if the employer retains or exercises the requisite amount of
control over the job site and has the opportunity to comply with OSHA regulations).
But see Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the OSH Act's general and specific clauses only regulate an employer's obligation to
provide safe work conditions for its immediate employees).
137. See, e.g., Teal, 728 F.2d at 804.
138. Whether Washington's recognition of a general contractor's innate
supervisory authority in Stute would apply to the OSH Act remains uncertain. See
Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 335, 582 P.2d at 506 (requiring that the general contractor
control the work area in which the hazard exists before imposing the duty to comply
with OSHA regulations).
139. Cochran v. International Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky. 1975)
(holding that the OSH Act does not provide a basis for recovery by an independent
contractor's injured employee against the job site owner who did not employ the injured
employee).
140. See Alabama, ALA. CODE § 25-1-1 (1992); Arizona, Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-
403 (1993); Arkansas, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-2-117 (Michie 1987); California, CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 6400, 6401 (West 1989); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-370 (West
1993); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1203 (1993); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 442.115 (West Supp. 1993); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 34-2-10 (Harrison 1990);
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 396-6 (1988); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 870, para. 225/3
(Smith-Hurd 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 88.4 (West 1988); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 338.031 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1988); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:13
(West 1985); Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 408.1011 (West 1993); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. § 182.653 (1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-71-201 (1993); Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 618.375 (1992); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6A-3 (West 1993);
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-9-5 (Michie 1993); New York, N.Y. LAB. LAw § 200
(McKinney 1992); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129 (1992); Ohio, Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (Anderson 1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 403 (West
Supp. 1994); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 654.010 (1991); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 28-20-8 (1986); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-80 (Law. Co-op. 1986);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-3-105 (1991); Texas, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 5182
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decisions interpreting these statutes have approached
extending liability for job site safety beyond an employee's
immediate employer in a variety of ways. 14 1 Absent specific
statutory mandate, 142 however, retaining control over some por-
tion of the job site or specific employee is critical before a court
will extend the duty to comply with safety regulations beyond
the employee's immediate employer. To date, Washington is
the only state that has abandoned a case-by-case control inquiry
and ruled as a matter of law that a general contractor's innate
supervisory authority justifies finding an exception to employer
nonliability and imposing a duty owed to all employees to com-
ply with statutory safety regulations.
V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL
REQUIREMENT
Whether the standard of care owed by an employer to an
independent contractor's employees is based on common law,
contract, or statute, a court must find an exception to the gen-
(1993); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-9-5 (1988); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 223
(1987); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.1 (Michie 1990); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE
§ 21-3A-5 (1989); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.11 (West 1988); Wyoming, Wyo.
STAT. § 27-11-105 (1991).
141. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Staples, 551 So. 2d 949 (Ala. 1989) (holding
that the statutory duty to provide a safe workplace is imposed upon the one who has
control or custody of the employment or place of employment); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Sunshield Insulation Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a general
contractor who is in control of the premises where work is being done by a
subcontractor's employees is an employer subject to a statutory nondelegable duty to
provide a safe place of employment and to comply with safety regulations); Phillips v.
United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
the owner/contractee did not owe a duty to the independent contractor's employee
because the owner did not retain control of the means and methods by which the
contractors engaged in their work); Murphy v. Stuart M. Smith, Inc., 455 A.2d 69 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (recognizing three circumstances where the duty to provide a safe
job site has been applied to someone other than the employee's direct employer: (1)
where the local jurisdiction's statute specifically requires that the employer maintain a
safe job site for all employees; (2) where the employer voluntarily assumes a duty for the
benefit of persons other than its own employees; and (3) where an owner or employer
creates the safety regulation violation or has actual control and substantial control over
the work area); Flores v. Metro Machinery Rigging, Inc., 783 P.2d 1024 (Oreg. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that under the state health and safety statute, an employer must have
control over or responsibility for the employee's work before the employer has a duty to
provide a safe workplace).
142. See, e.g., Smith v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 521 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982) (holding that an owner or contractor who violates the applicable labor
law specifically requiring that all owners and contractors provide safety devices is
strictly liable for injuries caused by its failure to supply safety devices regardless of its
control).
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eral rule of employer nonliability before imposing a duty to pro-
vide a safe workplace on the independent contractor's employer.
Under common law and WISHA, an employer's retention of con-
trol over some portion of the job site or the injured employee's
work will provide such an exception. 1
43
Within the construction context, a general contractor is
presumed to have innate supervisory authority that constitutes
per se control and justifies placing the duty to comply with
WISHA safety regulations on the general contractor as a matter
of law.144 Defendants who fit within WISHA's definition of
employer but lack supervisory authority, must have actual con-
trol of the dangerous condition to be held liable.
14 1
The justification behind the presumption of a general con-
tractor's innate supervisory authority fails to support its appli-
cation to a job site owner. The traditional nonparticipatory role
of a job site owner requires the court to resolve the issue of an
owner's liability on a case-by-case control inquiry. 146 Only
when the owner retains actual control over some portion of the
job site or work of an independent contractor or independent
contractor's injured employee may the court impose statutory
duties to provide a safe workplace.
Despite Washington's unprecedented willingness to impose
liability for job site safety on a general contractor as a matter of
law, the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply the
same rule of law to job site owners. This refusal was recently
reaffirmed in Hennig. 14' However, the decision in Hennig left
unresolved the issue of whether the duty to comply with
WISHA regulations may be imposed because of a job site
owner's presumed innate supervisory authority. Whether Hen-
nig applies to circumstances where a job site owner allegedly
violates a WISHA regulation will remain unanswered until the
Washington Supreme Court is faced with such a claim.
Because the presumption of innate supervisory authority
adopted in Stute merely satisfies the retained control exception
to the general rule of employer nonliability, it is applicable
whether the alleged duty to provide a safe workplace is based
on common law or statute. The supreme court's refusal to
143. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
146. See supra part IV.
147. See supra part III.C.
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apply the presumption in Hennig was not because the employer
failed to assert that the job site owner violated an applicable
WISHA regulation. Rather, the court refused to apply the pre-
sumption because a job site owner's role is not sufficiently
analogous to that of a general contractor to justify the pre-
sumption that the job site owner maintains innate supervisory
authority. Under these circumstances, the court must inquire
into the amount of control the job site owner actually retains
over the job site or injured employee's work before imposing
liability.
